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The	 voice	 of	 the	 Church	 and	 other	 faith	 groups	 has	 become	 a	 significant	
contribution	in	the	civic	lives	of	our	cities	and	the	development	of	urban	policy	
over	 the	 past	 25	 years.	 National	 government,	 regional	 development	 agencies,	
local	 authorities	 and	neighbourhood	 renewal	 programmes	 all	 regularly	 engage	
with	 religious	 bodies	 as	 part	 of	 the	 planning	 and	 delivery	 of	 regeneration	 and	
services	in	urban	communities.	Of	all	the	faith	groups,	it	is	the	Church	of	England,	
through	 the	 ubiquity	 of	 its	 presence	 and	 experience,	 that	 has	 accompanied	
communities,	 previously	 designated	 as	 Urban	 Priority	 Areas,	 experiencing	
economic	 and	 physical	 regeneration,	 often	 from	 within	 broad‐based	
partnerships	which	 have	 brought	 about	 significant	 change	 (Graham	 and	 Lowe,	
2009;	Davey,	2000).		
	













Since	 the	 mid‐eighties	 the	 Church	 of	 England	 has	 produced	 significant	
documentation	 of	 urban	 conditions	 and	 spoken	 of	 the	 Church’s	 dilemma	 as	 it	
attempts	 to	 remain	 faithful	 within	 an	 urban	 parish	 structure	 which	 is	
increasingly	overshadowed	by	suburban	congregational	agendas	(ACUPA,	1985;	
CULF,	2006).	While	there	have	been	calls	 for	a	greater	awareness	of	contextual	
approaches	 where	 theological	 method	 might	 provide	 a	 common	 ground	 for	
different	communities,	predominant	training	and	mission	agendas	have	inclined	
towards	suburban	models	and	practice.	 	 It	 is	apparent,	however,	 that	a	distinct	
dimension	 within	 British	 urban	 theological	 practice	 has	 been	 its	 tenacious	
interaction	with	liberation	theology,	a	commitment	to	social	justice	and	to	‘keep	







with	 many	 stake‐holders	 around	 the	 table	 seeking	 to	 invigorate	 and	 rebuild	
neighbourhood;	 others	 have	 found	 partnerships	 to	 be	 uneven,	 and	 at	 times	
token,	 as	 concessions	 are	made	 to	 a	 profit‐led	 regeneration	 industry	 (Harvey,	
2008;	 Steele,	 2009).	 Despite	 their	 own	 transnationalism,	 however,	 faith	
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contracts	 and	 grants,	 with	 attendant	 risks	 of	 collusion	 in	 the	 name	 of	
partnership.	At	times	this	has	meant	that	the	Church	and	other	faith	groups	have	
missed	or	not	understood	significant	shifts	in	policy,	such	as	the	marginalisation	
of	 community‐led	neighbourhood	 renewal	within	what	 is	 now	 the	Department	
for	 Communities	 and	 Local	 Government,	 and	 what	 Allan	 Cochrane	 (2007)	
identifies	as	the	disappearance	of	a	distinct	urban	policy	focus	from	the	political	
agenda.	 Justin	 Beaumont’s	 analysis	 of	 the	 re‐emergence	 of	 faith‐based	






secular	 society’	 (2008:	 2019),	 but	 the	 realignments	 of	 capital,	 civil	 society	 and	
the	 nation‐state	 as	 players	 in	 the	 regeneration	 game	 represent	 ambivalent	
opportunities	 for	 grass‐roots	 activism.	On	 the	one	hand,	 they	offer	new	spaces	
for	innovative	forms	of	engagement,	as	with	the	enhanced	public	profile	of	faith‐
based	 organisations	 in	 policy	 matters.	 On	 the	 other,	 however,	 they	 engender	
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alienation	amongst	those	who	find	themselves	receiving	little	benefit	from	urban	




Theologians	 and	 faith‐practitioners	 are	 only	 beginning	 to	 understand	 the	
consequences	of	asking	‘Who	is	the	city	for?’	as	part	of	the	‘What	makes	a	good	
city?’	debate.		Yet	questions	of	power,	participation	and	the	nature	of	citizenship	




the	 renewal	 of	 resources	 and	 infrastructure	 that	 might	 make	 a	 difference;	 or	
worse	 they	 are	 turning	 to	 those	who	 offer	 the	 alternative	 scenario	 of	 a	 nation	
that	resists	the	changes	brought	on	by	globalisation	and	immigration.	This	finds	
an	 outlet	 in	 the	 increasing	 hostility	 towards	 cosmopolitanism	 and	






disorderly,	 evidenced	 by	 riots	 and	 uprisings,	 as	 well	 as	 street‐level	 crime	





Blair,	 	 an	 ‘underclass	of	people	 	 cut	off	 from	society’s	mainstream	without	any	
sense	of	shared	purpose’	(Blair,	quoted	in	Lister,	2004:	108).	The	central	efforts	
of	the	New	Labour’s	Social	Exclusion	Unit	seemed	aimed	at	the	usual	focuses	of	
urban	 intervention	 and	 the	 Unit	was	 launched	 in	 1997	 by	 a	 prime	ministerial	
visits	to	the	multi‐ethnic	Aylesbury	Estate	in	South	London.		
	
In	 parallel	 with	 this,	 much	 of	 the	 regeneration	 activity	 focused	 on	 the	 built	
environment	 has	 concentrated	 on	 a	 new	 metropolitan	 elite	 who	 demand	
‘defended	 spaces’	within	 the	 urban	 core,	 gated	 and	monitored	 by	 CCTV.	While	
urban	writers	since	Engels	have	celebrated	the	city	as	an	encounter	of	strangers,	
urban	 restructuring	 has	 meant	 that	 those	 encounters	 with	 difference	 have	








Tariq	 Modood	 has	 defined	 multiculturalism	 as	 ‘the	 recognition	 of	 group	
difference	within	the	public	sphere	of	 laws,	policies,	democratic	discourses	and	
the	 terms	 of	 citizenship	 and	 national	 identity’	 (Modood,	 2007:	 2).	 Britain	 is	 a	
multicultural	society,	 therefore,	but	 the	adoption	of	policies	of	multiculturalism	
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implies	 a	 ‘normative	 response’	 (Parekh,	 2006:	 6)	 to	 the	 facts	 of	 ethnic	 and	
cultural	 difference.	 	 Diversity	 is	 upheld	 and	 celebrated,	 but	 in	 a	 way	 which	




the	 interaction	 of	 immigrant	 communities	 in	 Britain	 as	 the	 post‐immigration	
discourse	of	multiculturalism	and	‘political	blackness’	began	to	crack	when	faith	
entered	the	arena.		For	Tariq	Modood,	this	was	no	better	symbolised	than	in	the	
battle	 over	 The	 Satanic	 Verses	 in	 the	 mid‐1980s,	 when	 many	 Muslims	 were	
radicalised	 and	 organised	 discovering	 a	 new	 community	 identity	 based	 on	
religion	 rather	 than	 colour.	 This	 shift	 had	 significant	 impact	 on	 multicultural	
discourse	where	 religion	was	 generally	 perceived	 as	 culturally	 interesting	 but	
waning	 in	 terms	 of	 political	 significance.	 Yet	 the	 emergence	 of	 Islam	 as	 a	
publicly‐articulated	mark	of	 identity	was	perceived	as	a	threat	by	a	secularised	
media	 establishment	 alongside	 the	 increasingly	 Islamophobic	 right.	 	 	 What	 is	
noteworthy	 in	 terms	 of	 our	 concerns	 here	 is	 the	 significance	 that	 Modood	
attributes	 to	 the	 space	 created	 by	 cross‐religious	 dialogue	 during	 the	 Rushdie	
affair.	
	
…	what	was	 even	more	 striking	was	 that	 when	 the	 public	 rage	 against	
Muslims	was	at	its	most	intense,	Muslims	neither	sought	nor	were	offered	
any	special	solidarity	by	any	nonwhite	minority.	It	was	in	fact,	a	group	of	
white	 liberal	 Anglicans	 who	 tried	 to	 moderate	 hostility	 against	 angry	
Muslims,	 and	 it	 was	 in	 interfaith	 forum	 a	 rather	 than	 in	 political‐black		
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post‐secular	 public	 space,	 however.	 Whilst	 much	 of	 the	 focus	 in	 community	
relations	was	 concerned	with	 ‘multiculturalism’	 and	 the	presence	of	Black	 and	
south	Asian	communities	as	an	enrichment	of	British	culture,	such	an	emphasis	
did	 little	 to	understand	 the	 impact	of	mass	 immigration	upon	white	British	 (or	






Runnymede	 Trust,	 ‘an	 independent	 policy	 research	 organisation	 focusing	 on	
equality	and	justice	through	the	promotion	of	a	successful	multi‐ethnic	society’,	
recently	 published	 a	 document	 Who	 cares	 about	 the	 white	 working	 class?	
(Sveinssson,	 2009).	 Exploring	 how	 issues	 of	 ethnicity	 and	 class	 play	 out	 in	 a	





By	 warning	 of	 the	 danger	 of	 inflaming	 support	 for	 racist	 parties,	 what	
actually	happens	is	that	politicians	and	commentators	invoke	the	threat	of	
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Local	Government	argued	 that	 the	 successful	 integration	of	migrants	 into	 local	
communities	 is	 significantly	 conditioned	 by	 local,	 predominantly	 economic,	
factors:	
...	 we	 found	 that	 in	 those	 [places]	 where	 social	 and	 environmental	
conditions	were	better,	 there	was	 ...	 less	apparent	hostility	 to	minorities	
[...]	By	 far	 the	most	 frequent	context	 for	referring	to	ethnic	minorities	 is	
that	of	perceived	competition	 for	 resources	–	 typically	housing,	but	also	
employment,	 benefits,	 territory	 and	 culture.	 (Garner,	 Cowles	 and	 Lung,	
2009:	6)		
	
Such	 resentment,	 whilst	 reprehensible,	 has	 to	 be	 seen	 as	 one	 response	 to	
economic	 pressures.	 	 Black	 and	 ethnic	 minorities	 and	 the	 forces	 of	 ‘political	
correctness’	 are	 held	 up	 as	 scapegoats	 in	 a	 context	 of	 perceived	 unfairness	 of	
access	to	material	benefits;	and	in	a	political	climate	in	which	the	biggest	threat	
to	 our	way	 of	 life	 is	 often	 equated	with	 so‐called	 ‘radical	 Islam’,	 it	 is	 timely	 to	








As	 Modood	 comments,	 multiculturalism	 itself	 is	 in	 many	 respects	 a	 child	 of	
liberalism.	 It	 is	 founded,	 conceptually,	 on	 differences	 of	 ethnicity	 and	 ‘race’,	
reflecting	the	preoccupations	of	a	relatively	secular	generation	of	social	science	
which	took	little	substantial	account	of	religion	as	a	marker	of	identity.	This	has	
led,	 increasingly,	 to	 criticisms	 of	 the	 public	 sector	 and	 local	 and	 national	
government,	for	example,	for	their	lack	of	‘religious	literacy’	in	taking	account	of	
the	 needs	 of	 different	 sections	 of	 the	 community.	 Many	 commentators	 (see	










continue	 to	 believe	 that	 adherence	 to	 the	 demands	 of	 any	 kind	 of	 	 theology	
represents	 a	 denial	 of	 liberal	 values	 with	 an	 inevitable	 retreat	 into	 more	
pernicious	 forms	 of	 segregation	 and	 extremism.	 	 	 	 A	 recent	 contributor	 to	 the	
debate	has	been	Alan	Billings	–	priest,	broadcaster	and	New	Labour	apologist.	In	
God	 and	 Community	 Cohesion:	 Help	 or	 Hindrance	 (2009)	 Billings	 presents	 a	
pessimistic	 approach	 to	 attempts	 to	 establish	 common	 ground	 among	 faith	
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communities	 and	 shared	 vision	 within	 diverse	 cities.	 He	 notes	 the	
precariousness	 of	 attempts	 to	 build	 cohesive	 communities	 at	 a	 time	when	 the	





course,	 is	 the	debate	about	social	cohesion	and	the	perceived	 ‘threat’	of	radical	
Islam,	 and	 the	 implementation	 of	 policies	 such	 as	 PREVENT	 and	 ‘Face‐to‐Face	
and	Side‐by‐Side’	(DCLG,	2007).	There	is	criticism	that	the	PREVENT	agenda	fails	
to	 address	 issues	 of	 non‐Islamic	 extremisms	 and	 violence,	 not	 least	 that	
provoked	 by	 the	 presence	 of	 the	 British	 National	 Party	 and	 English	 Defence	
League	 (see	 Kundnani,	 2009).	 	 There	 is	 also	 wide	 misgiving	 amongst	 faith	
communities	themselves,	especially	within	Islam,	of	the	way	in	which	faith‐based	
organisations	 are	 being	 instrumentalised,	 almost	 as	 vehicles	 of	 social	 control,	
and	that	the	predominant	paradigm	of	faith	and	its	public	impact	on	the	part	of	
government	is	that	of	‘delivering’	particular	social	outcomes.	The	bizarre	reverse	




More	 benignly,	 perhaps,	 is	 also	 the	 potential	 of	 faith	 groups	 to	 participate	 in	
programmes	of	social,	cultural	and	economic	renewal,	and	even,	on	the	margins	
of	mainstream	political	life,	to	take	up	certain	aspects	of	welfare	provision.	So	we	
have	 begun	 to	 see	 how	 so‐called	 ‘faith	 communities’	 are	 being	 brought	 into	
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But	 does	 this	 re‐emergence	 of	 faith	 as	 part	 of	 a	 ‘thick	 description’	 of	 modern	
citizenship	 actually	 disenfranchise	 some	 people?	 Ted	 Cantle,	 author	 of	 the	
Report	into	the	Oldham	riots	of	2001,	has	remarked	that	‘the	majority	population	
have	 always	 felt	 unrepresented	 by	 the	 notion	 [of	multiculturalism]’	 (Cantle	 in	
Lowndes,	2009:	93).	He	continues,	 ‘if	you	ask	white	people,	for	example,	if	they	
have	an	ethnicity,	they	don’t	seem	to	appreciate	that	they	have	 ...	They	also	see	
‘diversity’	 as	 something	 that	 is	 only	 relevant	 to	 minorities.	 Similarly,	 most	
[white]	people	see	faith	as	another	dimension	which	doesn’t	include	them	–	the	
British	 tradition	has	been	built	upon	 the	submerging	of	 faith	differences	 in	 the	
public	 sphere.’	 (Cantle	 in	 Lowndes,	 2009:	 93)	 So	 there	 are	 ways	 in	 which	
‘multiculturalism’,	 if	 not	 failing	 the	 indigenous	 white	 British	 population,	 has	
proved	wanting	in	terms	of	white	‘buy‐in’	which	furnishes	them	with	the	means	
to	construct	an	identity	or	self‐understanding	to	match,	and	negotiate	with,		that	







all	 those	 “others”	 in	 relation	 to	whom	 “particularity”	 acquires	 a	 relative	
value.	(Hall,	2000:	234)		
	








communities?	 The	 re‐emergence	 of	 faith	 in	 terms	 of	 identity,	 rather	 than	
practice,	gives	rise	to	many	tiny	 ‘clashes	of	civilisations’	which	offer	 little	space	
for	 greater	 and	 smaller	 narratives	 of	 interaction	 and	 negotiation	 between	 and	




in	 places	 such	 as	 Luton,	 Rochdale,	 Birmingham	 and	 Manchester	 (Searchlight,	
August	 2009:	 8‐9).	 Nick	 Griffin,	 leader	 of	 the	 BNP,	 has	 described	 Islam	 as	 a	





identity	 around	 which	 they	 hope	 to	 rally	 indigenous	 White	 support	 that	

























The	 BNP	 response	 was	 to	 issue	 a	 leaflet,	 distributed	 outside	 a	 number	 of	
churches	and	cathedrals,	entitled	Judas	Archbishops:	
	
All	 over	 the	 UK	 pews	 are	 emptying;	 churches	 are	 closing	 down	 and	
turning	 into	 mosques/	 temples.	 Our	 distinctive	 Christian	 heritage	 is	
disappearing	 as	 whole	 regions	 of	 Britain	 become	 Islamified.	 […]The	
cowardly	‘yes	men’,	functionaries	and	time‐servers	leading	the	Church	of	
England	 have	 consistently	 failed	 to	 lift	 a	 finger	 in	 defence	 of	 Britain	
against	those	who	would	destroy	it.	Cocooned	in	their	ivory	towers	from	





direct	 experience	 of	 the	 demographic	 profile	 of	 the	 twenty‐first	 century	urban	
Church.	 It	 is	 remarkable	 to	 consider	 how	 far	 all	 the	 Christian	 denominations,	
including	 the	 Church	 of	 England,	 depend	 increasingly	 for	 their	 continued	
viability	on	members	whose	personal	or	family	backgrounds	originate	in	Africa,	




But	 this	 use	 of	 religion	 –	 or	 at	 least	 a	 discourse	 of	 a	 particular	 construal	 of	




North‐West	 and	 Yorkshire	 &	 Humberside	 regions	 respectively.	 The	 BNP’s		
electoral	 strongholds	 seem	 to	 be	 in	 predominantly	 white	 working‐class	
communities	 with	 higher	 than	 average	 levels	 of	 unemployment	 and	 economic	
decline:	post	 industrial	areas	or	 large	social	housing	developments.	Admittedly,	
there	 were	 particular	 factors	 behind	 the	 success	 of	 the	 BNP	 in	 the	 local	 and	
European	elections	of	May	2009,	such	as	a	slump	in	the	traditional	Labour	vote,	
and	 widespread	 revulsion	 at	 the	 MPs’	 expenses	 scandal.	 Yet	 this	 may	 still	 be	
regarded	 as	 consistent	 with	 the	 opportunism	 of	 the	 far	 Right	 in	 exploiting	
people’s	 disaffection	 with	 mainstream	 politics,	 including	 policies	 of	
multiculturalism	 and	 regeneration	 that	 are	 perceived	 as	 unfairly	 favouring	




Alongside	 the	 democratic	 deficit	 comes	 the	 cultural	 deficit	 fed	 by	 a	 general	
religious	 illiteracy.	 Questions	 of	 identity	 are	 raised	 for	 the	 majority	 when	 the	
religious	 difference	 of	 ‘the	 other’	 is	 perceived	 in	 public	 space:	 through	 civic	
celebrations	of	Eid	or	Diwali,	the	wearing	of	headscarves	or	turbans,	the	requests	
for	 prayer	 rooms	 or	 specially	 prepared	 food.	 The	 BNP’s	 advocacy	 of	 Christian	
identity	 comes	 at	 a	 time	 when	 the	 reassertion	 of	 identity	 is	 encouraged	 by	








What	are	 the	 tools	and	resources	which	might	enable	 the	Church	 to	rebuild	 its	
understanding	of	civic	engagement	in	a	culturally	and	religiously	diverse	society	
in	 the	 face	 of	 economic	 interests,	 disaffection	 with	 the	 political	 system	 and	
organised	racism?							The	ability	to	mobilise	across	communities	is	critical		to	an		
urban	 rights	 discourse	 which	 has	 significant	 connections	 with	 a	 	 liberationist	
perspective,	as	well	as	the	concerns	of	the	emergent	public	theology	movement	
(See	Davey,	2008)	;	but	we	have	yet	to	develop	an	understanding	and	vocabulary	
that	 enables	 us	 to	 	 develop	 a	 theologically	 rooted	 progressive	 urbanism	 that	
overcomes	 alienation	 and	 celebrates	 the	 contribution	 of	 ordinary	 citizens	
through	engaging	outside	the	Church’s	traditional	comfort	zones.		
	
Influenced	by	 the	work	of	Henri	Lefebvre	 leading	urbanists	have	 identified	 the	
concept	 of	 ‘the	 right	 to	 the	 city’	 (le	droit	à	 la	 ville)as	 a	 critical	 resource	 in	 the	
neoliberal,	 postsecular	 city.	 Access	 and	 participation	 in	 urban	 life	 and	 spaces	
needs	to	be	reasserted	as	cities	restructure	spatially,	economically	and	socially.	
David	 Harvey	 argues	 that,	 ‘The	 freedom	 to	 make	 and	 remake	 our	 cities	 and	
ourselves	 is…one	 of	 the	 most	 precious	 yet	 neglected	 of	 our	 human	 rights’	
(Harvey	2008).	 	Ash	Amin	has	written	of	the	need	to	fashion	a	 ‘politics	of	well‐
being	 and	 emancipation	 out	 of	 multiplicity	 and	 difference	 and	 from	 the	
particularities	of	the	urban	experience’	(Amin	2006).		It	is	a	critical	question	for	
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urbanists	 how	 a	 wider	 spectrum	 of	 interests	 can	 play	 a	 crucial	 part	 in	
reimagining	the	city	and	staking	a	claim	to	common	urban	future.	It	is	vital	that	
the	discourse	and	activities	of	urbanists	are	not	another	reason	for	the	alienation	
of	 the	 urban	 dispossessed.	 	 Patsy	 Healey’s	 often	 quoted	 phrase	 about	 the	






opposing	 views	 of	 urban	 life,	 diversity,	 the	 power	 of	 urban	 structures,	 the	
meaning	 and	 pitfalls	 of	 living	 in	 close	 proximity	 to	 mainstream	 	 policy	 and	
solutions.	Just	as	Alan	Cochrane	describes	government	interventions	as	a	‘policy	








as	within	 the	 local	 community.	Who	 is	 the	 church	 there	 for?	What	will	 be	 the	
impact	 of	 those	 decisions	 on	 different	 faith	 or	 ethnic	 communities?	 Those	




















In	 what	 ways	 might	 the	 Church’s	 action	 and	 theological	 interventions	 be	
expanding	 the	 habits	 of	 solidarity?	 	 Three	 case	 studies	 follow,	which	 illustrate	
possible	ways	 in	which	 the	Church	within	 its	 community	 context	has	begun	 to	
articulate	 constructive	 forms	 of	 engagement	 with	 the	 political	 situation.	 We	
cannot	pretend	that	by	themselves	they	constitute	decisive	arguments	in	favour	





The	 first	 example	 shows	 how	 churches	 worked	 to	 build	 a	 positive	 political	
coalition	 in	 the	 fight	against	extremism.	 In	advance	of	 the	 June	elections	 to	 the	
European	 Parliament,	 it	 was	 known	 that	 the	 BNP	 were	 statistically	 close	 to	
winning	 some	 seats,	 so	 a	 broad‐based	 alliance	 called	 HOPE	 not	 Hate	 was	
founded,	 sponsored	 by	 trade	 unions,	 anti‐fascist	 groups	 and	 the	 investigative	
journal	 Searchlight.	 Faith	 groups,	 including	 and	 especially	 Church	 of	 England	
leaders	 and	 staff,	 were	 also	 prominent.	 In	 the	 NW,	 for	 example,	 the	HOPE	not	
Hate	 campaign	 was	 launched	 at	 Manchester	 Anglican	 Cathedral,	 and	 the	
resources	 of	 the	 staff	 of	 the	 diocesan	 Board	 for	 Ministry	 and	 Society	 kept	 up	
much	of	the	momentum.	Unfortunately,	of	course,	the	voting	maths	only	limited	
the	scale	of	the	BNP	‘break	through’,	but	the	campaign	has	continued	to	mobilise,		






their	 communities,	 which	 is	 dependent	 on	 the	 skills,	 values	 and	 resources	 at	
their	disposal	that	enable	them	to	mobilise	and	to	form	relationships	both	within	
and	 between	 immediate	 communities	 of	 interest	 (Putnam,	 2000).	 It	 has	 been	
further	 noted	 that	 religious	 people	 and	 organisations	 are	 particularly	 rich	 in	



















Town	 (2009),	This	 featured	 the	 community	of	 South	Oxhey,	 in	Hertfordshire,	 a	
large	 post‐war	 social	 housing	 estate,	 with	 many	 of	 the	 characteristics	 of	 high	
unemployment,	low	educational	achievement	and	social	problems;	a	community	
often	considered	out	of	place,	or	out	of	 step,	with	 the	surrounding	affluence	of	
the	 Home	 Counties.	 The	musician	 and	 conductor	 Gareth	Malone	 established	 a	






focused	 on	 the	 stories	 of	 individuals,	 the	 Church	 was	 a	 constant	 source	 of	
support,	 providing	 an	 office	 base	 for	Malone	 and	 a	 significant	 volunteer	 base.	
Once	again,	 it	 is	Lowles’	evocation	of	the	grass‐roots	activism	both	of	HOPE	not	
Hate	and	of	the	churches	in	general,	that	is	probably	the	most	critical	role	for	the	
Church	 in	 such	 areas	where	 there	 are	 significant	 extremist	 threats.	 It	 is	 in	 the	
Church’s	localism	and	its	capacity	to	mobilise	a	wealth	of	local	social	capital	that	




capital,	 in	 that	 it	 illustrates	 how	 the	 revival	 of	 the	 instruments	 of	 local	 civil	
society	helped	to	rejuvenate	local	community	pride.		Furthermore,	a	‘coda’	to	this	
story	 offers	 further	 suggestions	 that	 the	 choir	 has	 succeeded	 in	 fostering	 an	
alternative	 account	 of	 civic	 identity	 that	 is	 less	 prone	 to	 the	 resentments	
highlighted	by	the	Runnymede	Trust	and	DCLG.	 	The	British	National	Party	had	
earlier	 experienced	 some	 electoral	 gains	 in	 south	 Hertfordshire,	 including	 the	
election	 of	 a	 candidate	 to	 the	 county	 council.	 When	 the	 councillor	 concerned	




In	 Lancashire,	 the	 church’s	 response	 to	 the	 2001	 riots	 and	 the	 subsequent	




delivered	 create	 opportunities	 for	 people	 from	 different	 faith,	 cultural,	 socio‐
economic	 contexts’	 (see	 http://bbburnley.co.uk/FaithFriends.aspx).	 The	
programme	has	had	major	influence	in	communities	where	there	had	been	little	
encounter	or	mutual	understanding,	particularly	among	young	people.	Activities	







I	 think	 the	 depth	 of	 friendship	 there	 is	 between	 representatives	 of	
different	 faiths	here	 is	pretty	 impressive	 in	 itself,	 but	 also	 listening	 to	 a	
twelve	 year	 old	 talking	 about	 her	 part	 in	 building	 bridges	 between	
communities	 and	 the	 work	 that’s	 done	 to	 keep	 children	 of	 different	
communities	in	touch	with	each	other	and	sharing	experiences,	that	is	so	
precious	 and	 so	 unusual	 I	 think,	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 country	 as	 a	whole,	 is	
something	 that	 ought	 to	 be	 bottled	 and	 exported	 from	 Burnley.	 (Radio	
Lancashire	5th	November	2009)	
	









civil	 society	 emerging	 from	 the	 new,	 post‐secular	 contentions	 of	 religious	
identity	 and	 race.	 The	 reproduction	 of	 social	 capital	 is	 not	 always	 a	 natural	
outcome	 of	 the	 presence	 of	 faith	 in	 the	 public	 realm,	 which	 often	 enters	 that	
space	out	of	the	frustration	and	anger	of	groups	which	have	been	marginal	to	the	
economy	 of	 urban	 regeneration	 in	 the	 past	 decades.	 Violent	 competing	 claims	
are	often	local	reactions	to,	or	refractions	of,	wider	structural	forces	played	out	
on	a	global	stage.	The		‘othering’	of	groups	within	our	cities	and	towns,	be	it	the	
racialized	 othering	 found	 in	 popular	 press	 portrayal	 of	 Muslims	 and	 other	
Asians,	 or	 the	 pseudo‐sociological	 rhetoric	 of	 chavs	 and	 underclasses	 find	
immediate	 scapegoats	 but	 fail	 to	 take	 into	 account	 issues	 of	 power,	 access	 to	
education	 and	 employment	 or	 the	 superficial	 appeal	 of	 pejorative	 media	
representation.				
	
Urbanists	 often	 invoke	 the	 contested	 nature	 of	 urban	 space	 as	 a	 source	 of	 the	
city’s	 dialectical	 creativity	 (see	 Merrifield,	 2002).	 These	 points	 of	 friction	 will	
need	 to	 be	 acknowledged	 and	 negotiated	 innovatively,	 rather	 than	 ignored	 or	
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